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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Technology Transfer Intelligence Committee

TTIC-M-350-86
 18 July 1986

THE MINUTES OF THE FORTY-FIFTH TTIC MEETING--16 JULY 1986

Organization

Chairman
 Air Force
 Air Force/FTD
 CIA
 Customs
 DIA
 Commerce
 DoD (P)
 DoE
 FBI
 Justice
 Navy/NISC
 State/INR
 State/ACDA
 NSA
 NSC

Members/Alternates

[REDACTED] 25X1
 Maj. Mario T. Avalos
 Mr. James Bartley

[REDACTED] 25X1
 Mr. Ted Klemann

[REDACTED] 25X1
 Mr. Keith Fennell
 Mr. David E. Whitman
 Mr. Robert Bingham
 Mr. Roger Diehl
 Mr. Rick Cinquegrana
 Mr. Russell Vaughan
 Mr. Rodney L. Huff
 Mr. W. Craig Stier

[REDACTED] 25X1
 Absent

Others Present

DIA
 DoD
 CIA
 OSTP
 Justice
 AFOSI/IVOX
 CIA/DO
 CIA/OGC
 OSD/DTSA
 OSD/DTSA
 OSD
 Commerce
 AF/SS
 NSA/G7
 NSA/G7

[REDACTED] 25X1
 Mr. Michael Maloof

[REDACTED] 25X1
 Mr. Jack Wood
 Mr. Kurt Weissmeuller
 Ms. JoAnn Short

[REDACTED] 25X1
 Mr. Walter Earle
 Mr. John Graham
 LTC Bernie McDaniel
 Ms. Betty Velte

TTIC Secretariat

[REDACTED] 25X1

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THE MINUTES OF THE FORTY-FIFTH TTIC MEETING--16 JULY 1986

1. Minutes. The minutes of the June meeting (TTIC-M-329) were discussed. [] noted some changes to indicate that the ideas generated at the brainstorming session at FTD on SDI were unevaluated. The suggested changes were noted in the TTIC file copy of the minutes. [] 25X1
2. COMEX. [] Chairman, COMEX, reported that the COMEX workload has been steadily increasing in relation to the increasing policy interest in US-USSR S&T bilaterals and exchanges. He said that COMEX was a key participant in the State-chaired interagency committee that is responsible for reviewing US-USSR bilateral agreements and probably will be asked more frequently to review potential agreements. In general, [] said he believed the impact of COMEX is greater now than it was in the past. For example, COMEX is presently involved in supporting policy deliberations about exchange programs for IIASA and about supercomputer access. [] asked that TTIC review COMEX products on the broad range of issues related to exchanges and bilaterals. [] said that high-level DoD (Policy) participation can be expected for COMEX meetings. [] welcomed the participation and commented that the line between policy determination and intelligence judgments needed to be carefully maintained. Mr. Maloof commented that this high-level participation was because DoD views the S&T exchanges and bilaterals between the US and USSR as major policy issues. He said that keeping track of Soviet visitors in the US was difficult and that DoD would be asking the FBI for information on this topic. [] 25X1
3. EXCON. [] Chairman, EXCON, said that EXCON currently was focusing its efforts on diversions and providing intelligence information for demarche action by State. He said that EXCON had announced a new technology transfer study on Taiwan. Mr. Maloof commented favorably on the work of EXCON's ad hoc group on diversions which he said resulted recently in stopping three shipments to the Soviet Bloc. [] 25X1
4. Second-hand computers. [] asked what was known about the second-hand computer market and asked that the topic be discussed at the September TTIC meeting. [] offered to arrange a briefing on what CIA/OSWR/TTAC was doing in this area. Mr. Maloof suggested that a working group be formed to study the second-hand computer issue. Mr. Fennell, DoC, said the second-hand computer market was hard to define but that DoC possibly could ask US companies what happens to used computers. [] 25X1

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5. Israel memorandum. After discussion about the substance of the memorandum and the CIA/OSWR/TTAC typescript study, it was decided that [] and Mr. Britt Snider should meet to discuss some sensitive information on this topic. [] agreed that if more information was available, the study could be reexamined. []

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6. Response to SDIO. The general consensus of the members was that the draft TTIC response to SDIO intelligence requirements was too broad given the limited resources in the IC to do the work. [] NSA, suggested that [] meet with Barry Leven, SDIO, to discuss what TTIC might be able to do to assist the SDIO. Mr. Bartley, FTD, and [] DIA, suggested the formation of a working group to lay out a plan of what TTIC can do now and in the next several years. [] said there were two aspects, one was the TTIC response to the ICS and the other was the TTIC planning task. He said he would give Barry Leven the draft TTIC memorandum and ask him to attend the September TTIC meeting to discuss the SDIO need for TTIC support. []

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7. Other.

a. The Greece study was accelerated at the request of the NSC and State.

b. [] along with Captain Joe Miller from FTD and Norb Crookston from CIA/OSWR/TTAC briefed a PFIAB working group on the Soviet technology acquisition program. The PFIAB working group is assessing the IC's contribution to SDIO.

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c. [] thanked Mr. James Bartley, FTD, for hosting the June TTIC meeting. He complimented FTD for having good people who are doing good work in technology transfer analysis.

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d. Mr. Cinquegrana, Justice, said that Justice was planning to host the Academic Advisory Panel meeting in November.

e. Mr. Maloof commented that a bill submitted recently would eliminate about 40 percent of the items from the commodity control list in two years.

f. [] said that there appeared to be a considerable amount of reporting on the technology transfer problem with regard to North Korea. He said that no one appears to be evaluating information about North Korea in terms of technology transfer and suggested that perhaps TTIC should do a study. [] SOVA, who substituted for the CIA member, said he would check with CIA to see if anyone had additional information. [] suggested that, depending on information availability, TTIC could form a small working group to conduct a study.

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- g. Mr. David Whitman, DoD (P), reviewed the contents of a DoE paper on the characteristics of a material that could be used for a variety of military systems. No one knew whether the material - a 3M produced Nextel ceramic fiber - was controlled.
- h. Mr. Whitman noted that the DoD document screening board was about to become operational. The board will review documents before they are sent to the NTIS.
- i. [redacted] NSA, said that they had just published an extensive report [redacted]

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[redacted]
Executive Secretary

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